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An Introduction to Federal
Administrative Law Part If:
The Availability of Judicial Review
by William L. Andreen
This is the last article in a two-part
series which is intended to present a
broad overview of federal administrative
law. Part 1 in this series discussed the rule-
making and adjudicatory powers that are
commonly possessed by federal agencies
and the standards used by the federal
judiciary to determine the validity of
rulemaking and adjudicatory action. This
final article will examine the various
threshold questions that confront parties
seeking judicial review of agency action
such as jurisdiction, preclusions of re-
view, sovereign immunity, standing, and
timing.
I. Availability of judicial review
A. Jurisdiction
1. Specific grants
Most federal regulatory statutes spe-
cifically provide for judicial review of cer-
tain kinds of administrative action. In do-
ing so, Congress has chosen a wide vari-
ety of routes for judicial review. For ex-
ample, orders denying or terminating
social security benefits are reviewable in
federal district courts, while cease and
desist orders issued by the Federal Trade
Commission may be challenged only in
an appropriate United States court of ap-
peals.!
Congress has in some cases made
things even more complicated. Under
the Clean Air Act, for instance, a nation-
al ambient air quality standard rule pro-
mulgated by the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) must be
challenged in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia?
However, a challenge to an EPA action
which is locally or regionally applicable,
such as EPA's approval of a state imple-
mentation plan, may be taken only to the
court of appeals in the appropriate cir-
cuit. In either case, the petition for
review must be filed within 60 days after
notice of the final rule or approval ap-
pears in the Federal Register.5 In addition,
the Clean Air Act authorizes a suit to be
brought in a United States district court
in a case where the complainant alleges
a failure by EPA to perform any nondis-
cretionary duty under the Act.6 Therefore,
due to the complexity and variety of jur-
isdictional grants, one should pay close
attention to the jurisdictional provisions
contained in the particular regulatory
statute in question.
2. General grants
Despite the plethora of specific juris-
dictional grants, there are many kinds of
administrative action for which Congress
did not explicitly provide an avenue to
obtain judicial review. In that situation,
an aggrieved person must predicate jur-
isdiction upon a more general grant of
jurisdiction such as 28 U.S.C. §
1331-general "federal question" jurisdic-
tion. Section 1331 provides that "[tihe dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States" Most challenges to federal ad-
ministrative action for which there is no
specific jurisdictional provision will
clearly meet this test. Prior to 1976, how-
ever, section 1331 also required that the
amount in controversy had to exceed
$10,0007 Consequently, many challenges
involving relatively small pecuniary
amounts were based upon other general
grants of jurisdiction such as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 which provides for mandamus. In
a number of instances, plaintiffs asserted
that sections 701-704 of the APA created
an independent source of jurisdiction for
district courts, and seven circuit courts,
agreed with that interpretation.'
This dilemma was resolved in 1976
when Congress eliminated the $10,000
jurisdictional amount in cases brought
against a federal agency under section
1331. A year later, the Supreme Court,
relying in large measure upon the
amendment to section 1331, held that
sections 701-704 of the APA do not con-
fer subject-matter jurisdiction upon dis-
trict courts. 0
B. Preclusion of review
Despite the assertion of an appropriate
grant of jurisdiction, judicial review,
nevertheless, may not be available. Sec-
tion 701 of the APA states that the APAs
provisions concerning judicial review do
not apply where (1) a statute precludes
judicial review or (2) "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."'
These two hurdles to judicial review
run counter to the basic presumption
favoring judicial review which is em-
bodied in the APA 2 After all, the APA
provides that any person "adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action...
is entitled to judicial review thereof*"1
3
Consequently, the Supreme Court has
declared that access to the courts should
be restricted "only upon a showing of
clear and convincing evidence" of con-
gressional intent to that effect0
4
Express statutory preclusion of judicial
review is not common, and, even when
such preclusion exists, the courts are like-
ly to give it a narrow interpretation' 5 For
instance, the administration of veteran
benefits has long been insulated to some
extent from judicial scrutiny. In Tracv v.
Gleason) 6 the court held that the prohibi-
tion on review of "any question of law
or fact concerning a claim for [veteran]
benefits" (38 U.S.C. §211[a] [19581) did not
apply to the termination of benefits. 7 The
court clearly thought that the termination
of benefits did not involve a "claim" In
response, Congress amended the section
to bar judicial review of "the decisions
of the Administrator of any question of
law or fact under any law administered
by the Veterans Administration IVA] pro-
viding benefits for veterans.. ..,,1 The
Supreme Court, however, held that this
prohibition did not preclude an attack on
one such decision because the challenge
went to the constitutionality of the Vet-
erans' Adjustment Act of 1966 rather than
the VA's administration of the statute 9
Judicial review under the APA is also
unavailable where an "action is commit-
ted to agency discretion by law.'20 This
exception to reviewability applies only
"in those rare instances where 'statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply"
21
The Supreme Court recently identified
such a rare instance when it held that an
agency's decision not to undertake ad-
ministrative or civil enforcement against
a violation of the law is a decision gen-
January 1990
erally committed to the unfettered discre-
tion of the agency. Therefore, such a de-
cision is presumptively unreviewable
2
The presumption may be rebutted, how-
ever, where Congress has indicated an in-
tent to limit the agency's enforcement
discretion and has provided guidelines
for the agency to follow. In such an in-
stance, there would be some "law to ap-
ply."123
C. Sovereign immunity
Only Congress has the power to deter-
mine whether the United States may be
sued, and, if so, in which courts the suit
may be brought? 4 Where Congress has
not waived the sovereign immunity of the
United States, no officer of the federal
government has the authority to consent
to a suit against the government?5 Al-
though the defense of sovereign immuni-
ty blocked many challenges to agency
action in the past, it poses much less of
a problem today.
Congress amended the APA in 1972 to
eliminate the defense of sovereign im-
munity in cases brought in federal court
where the complainant seeks "relief
other than money damages.2 6 Therefore,
an action seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief no longer will be hampered by
sovereign immunity. This waiver, of
course, does not apply to a case brought
against the United States in a state court.
In such a situation, the government still
will be cloaked with sovereign immunity,
unless an explicit statutory waiver ap-
plies. Moreover, sovereign immunity still
may provide the federal government with
an absolute defense to an action seeking
monetary relief.7
D. Standing
Related to the issue of whether a par-
ticular claim is appropriate for judicial
review is the question of whether that
claim may be advanced by a particular
plaintiff or petitioner. This latter question
involves the requirement of standing. The
constitutional source of standing law is
Article III, § 2 which restricts federal
judicial power to "cases" and "controver-
sies."
Prior to 1940, the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed standing as if it were an integral
part of the merits of a case. A party thus
could obtain judicial review of agency
action only if that action invaded a legal
right of the party which was created by
statute or common law?8 This analysis,
of course, confused the threshold issue
of standing with the ultimate merits of a
claim. Moreover, it served to reduce the
ability of the federal judiciary to monitor
the expanded activities of the federal
bureaucracy. This venerable formulation
of the standing doctrine began to crum-
ble, as a result, during the 1940s.
The Supreme Court, during that de-
cade, recognized that Congress could ex-
plicitly grant a right of judicial review to
any person aggrieved or adversely af-
fected by a particular agency action, re-
gardless of whether that person could
show a violation of a "legally protected
interest." Thus, a party could obtain re-
view merely by demonstrating a personal
injury in a situation where a statutory
provision granted standing to aggrieved
persons or, in other words, to private at-
torney generals? 9
In 1946, the APA was enacted and pro-
vided that a person "adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute" could ob-
tain judicial review.30 The federal courts,
however, generally refused to view sec-
tion 702 as a broad grant of standing. In-
stead, the courts held that section 702
only provided standing where the in-
terest in question was recognized by
some other statute 1 Consequently, the
legal interest test still had some residual
vitality.
In 1970, however, the Supreme Court
re-examined the issue of standing under
the APA and, in the process, drastically
revised existing law. In Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp,32 the court rejected, once and for
all, the test of a legally recognized in-
terest. In its place, the Court substituted
a new two-part test. The first test is based
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on the constitutional requirement of a
case or controversy. Thus, a plaintiff must
allege that the agency's action caused the
plaintiff some "injury in fact, economic
or otherwise "'"' Moreover, the dispute
must be "presented in an adversary con-
text and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution ' 34 The sec-
ond test requires that "the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant [must
be] arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the sta-
tute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion' 35 This is based upon section 702
of the APA as well as more general pru-
dential considerations.36
Data Processing is still good law. Since
1970, however, the Supreme Court has
handed down a number of decisions
which refine the two-part test first enun-
ciated in Data Processing. In Sierra Club
v. Morton,37 the Court held that the party
seeking review must allege facts show-
ing that he or she is among those ad-
versely affected by the agency's action.
A litigant thus must assert a direct stake
in the controversy.38 But such a stake
need not be economic. Environmental or
aesthetic injury, for example, is enough
to satisfy the requirement of an injury in
fact29 Furthermore, the alleged injury
need not be significant. Even an "identi-
fiable trifle" is enough to give a party
standing to vindicate an important prin-
ciple0
It is clear, nevertheless, that the Court
will not extend standing to a party who
has not alleged facts demonstrating some
causal link between the agency's action
and the party's alleged injury.1 If this
causal link is too speculative or serious-
ly attenuated, standing will also be
denied.!2 Such denials have been predi-
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cated upon the Article III requirement
that, in order to be justiciable, a case
must be capable of judicial resolution.41
These rules are easily articulated but
rather difficult to apply. In close cases,
therefore, it may be hard to predict
whether a court will find that a party
seeking judicial relief has satisfied the re-
quirements of standing. 
4
E. Timing
The doctrines of primary jurisdiction,
finality, exhaustion of administrative
remedies, and ripeness are all designed
to avoid unnecessary or untimely judicial
involvement in the administrative pro-
cess. They do not forbid judicial review,
but merely postpone the time at which
a court may entertain a particular matter.
1. Primary jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
a judicially created principle designed to
deal with a situation where both a court
and an agency have the legal authority
to address the same dispute. For exam-
ple, the federal courts have the power to
hear a complaint alleging an illegal re-
straint of trade such as a conspiracy to
fix prices, while the Federal Trade Com-
mission has the power to determine
whether such price fixing constitutes an
unfair trade practice. When both arms of
government have the power to act, which
should be regarded as having primary
jurisdiction?
In such a case, the federal courts have
recognized the primary jurisdiction of
the agency, thereby postponing judicial
consideration of the case, if that course
of action will lead to more uniformity in
decisionmaking.45 The courts also have
deferred to an agency where it possesses
specialized knowledge and expertise that
would be of use in resolving the contro-
versy 6
2. Finality
Section 704 of APA provides that
"[algency action made reviewable by sta-
tute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review."
47
Consequently, in the absence of express
statutory authority to the contrary, a pre-
liminary or intermediate agency ruling is
not reviewable until the agency has taken
final action48
A statute, however, may specifically
speed up the process. For example, the
January 1990
Freedom of Information Act authorizes
judicial review where an agency fails to
respond to an information request within
a certain time period. 9 On the other
hand, a statute may state that an action
is final for purposes of judicial review on-
ly after a number of steps (hearings, ap-
peals, etc.) are taken within the agency.
Finally, a number of agencies have also
used regulations to define the point at
which a particular action becomes final.
In the absence of a statute or regula-
tion which defines finality for purposes
of judicial review, it may not always be
clear when agency action is final. In such
a situation, reference to the judicially-
created doctrines of exhaustion and ripe-
ness may help define the time at which
a dispute may be taken to court.
3. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies
No party is entitled to judicial review
until that party has exhausted the pre-
scribed administrative remedies.O Thus,
if an administrative proceeding is at an
early stage and the party who seeks judi-
cial review has a right to an agency hear-
ing or appeal, a court generally will re-
fuse to entertain the case because that
party has failed to await the completion
of the administrative process.
A number of factors favor the applica-
tion of the exhaustion doctrine: (1) it re-
spects the choice made by Congress to
delegate initial decisionmaking authority
to an agency; (2) it allows an agency to
bring its expertise to bear on a particular
issue; (3) it prevents judicial review from
proceeding on the basis of an inadequate
administrative record; and (4) it avoids
the necessity for judicial involvement in
cases where the agency is able to resolve
the problem? However, a court might in-
tervene in a pending agency proceeding
-an "extraordinary remedy" where it is
"necessary to vindicate an unambiguous
statutory or constitutional right "'
52
4. Ripeness
The doctrine of ripeness concerns the
ability of a court to resolve a particular
dispute without further refinement of the
issues by an administrative agency.
[Ilts basic rationale is to prevent the
courts, through avoidance of prema-
ture adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies, and also
to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the
challenging partieso
3
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner 54 in-
volved an attempt to obtain judicial re-
view of a Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) rulemaking before it was enforced
against any party. The final rule required
pharmaceutical companies to include a
drug's generic name on all labels and in
all advertising whenever the drug's pro-
prietary name was used.P- Abbott claimed
that the FDA had exceeded its sta-
tutory authority in promulgating the rule,
The FDA, on the other hand, argued that
the case was not appropriate for judicial
review since the rule had not yet been
applied in the context of an actual en-
forcement action.
On the question of ripeness, the Su-
preme Court established a two-part test.
First, a court must examine whether the
issues presented are fit for judicial review.
Second, a court must consider whether
the parties seeking review will suffer sub-
stantial hardship if review is withheldY'
In applying the first part of the test, the
Court held that the sole issue presented
was appropriate for judicial review. This
case posed the purely legal question of
whether the FDA had the authority to re-
quire a generic name to appear every
time a proprietory name was employed.
Moreover, since the rulemaking was
final, no further administrative action was
necessary in order to refine the case for
judicial reviews7 The Court also held that
Abbott would suffer substantial hardship
if judicial review were refused. Abbott
either would have to comply with the
regulation at some considerable cost, or
refuse to comply and thereby risk prose-
cutionP Therefore, absent some statu-
tory bar, Abbott was entitled to judicial
review because the case was indeed ripe.
Allowing for pre-enforcement chal-
lenges to agency rulemakings makes a
great deal of sense. If the government pre-
vails, industry must comply. On the other
hand, should the government lose, the
agency can quickly change course and
revise the rule as necessary. Recognizing
the pragmatic nature of this reasoning,
Congress now often restricts judicial re-
view of rulemakings to the pre-enforce-
ment periodY 9
Conclusion
The administrative state is neither a
monster nor a misfortune. It is rather a
structure built over the course of two cen-
turies which is designed to further the
collective goals of the American people.
The rise of the administrative state, never-
theless, has posed a challenge to the
ability of the American legal system to
establish a proper equilibrium among
our three branches of government. The
challenge involves the question of how
federal power will be allocated and re-
quires our legal system to come to grips
with the real tension which exists be-
tween the necessary role of administra-
tive discretion and the need for some de-
gree of accountability. The struggle to
balance the conflicting, but complemen-
tary, roles of specialized expertise and ex-
ternal control is the dynamic that has
shaped and continues to shape the con-
tours of federal administrative law. IN
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